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Abstract A two-party quantum private comparison scheme using GHZ states
and error-correcting code (ECC) was introduced in Li et al.’s paper [Int. J. Theor.
Phys. 52: 2818-2815, 2013], which holds the capability of fault-tolerate and could
be performed in a none-ideal scenario. However, this study points out there exists a
fatal loophole under a special attack, namely the twice-Hadamard-CNOTattack. A
malicious party may intercept the other’s particles, firstly executes the Hadamard
operations on these intercepted particles and his (her) own ones respectively, and
then sequentially performs twice CNOT operations on them and the auxiliary
particles prepared in advance. As a result, the secret input will be revealed without
being detected through measuring the auxiliary particles. For resisting this special
attack, an improvement is proposed by applying a permutation operator before
TP sends the particle sequences to all the participants.
Keywords Quantum private comparison · GHZ state · twice-Hadamard-CNOT
attack · Improvement
1 Introduction
Since quantum mechanics principles are introduced into cryptography, quantum
cryptography attracts more and more attention. Due to the characteristic of quan-
tum unconditional security, many quantum cryptography protocols, such as quan-
tum key distribution (QKD) [1-3], quantum direct communication (QDC) [4-7],
quantum secret sharing (QSS) [8-10], quantum teleportation (QT) [11,12], have
been proposed to solve various secure problems.
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Recently, quantum private comparison (QPC) has become an important branch
in quantum cryptography. Based on the properties of quantum mechanics, the
participants can determine whether their secret inputs are equal or not without
disclosing their own secrets to each other. In 2009, Yang et al. [13] put forward a
pioneering QPC scheme based on Bell states and a hash function. Since then, a
large number of QPC protocols utilizing the entangled states, such as EPR pairs,
GHZ state, etc., have been proposed [14-23].
However, these QPC protocols [13-23] are feasible in the ideal scenario but not
secure in practical scenario where faults (including noise and error) are existent in
the quantum channel and measurement. In order to solve the problem, in 2013, Li
et al. [24] present a novel QPC scheme based on GHZ states and error-correcting
code (ECC) against noise. But, through analyzing Li et al.’s QPC scheme, we find
it is unsecure under a special attack, called the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack. To
be specific, if any malicious party performed the twice-Hadamard-CNOT attack,
he (she) can get another’s secret input, which goes against the QPC’s principles
[25]. In order to fix the loophole, a simple solution by adopting a permutation
operator before TP distributes the particles to the participants, is proposed.
The rest of this paper is constructed as follows. At first, Li et al.’s QPC protocol
is briefly reviewed in Sect. 2. And in Sect. 3, we analyze the security of Li et
al.’s QPC protocol by introducing the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, and give an
improvement to fix the problem. Finally, a short collusion is drawn in Sect. 4.
2 Review of Li et al.’s QPC protocol
In the Ref. [24], in order to guarantee the QPC protocols secure in the practical
scenario, Li et al. present a new two-party QPC scheme by using error-correcting
code. The whole protocol consists of eight steps as below.
(1) Alice, Bob and Calvin prepare a [m,n] error-correcting code which uses m
bits codeword to encode n bits word and can correct l error bits in codeword
with the error-correcting function D(xm) according to the fault rate of the
noise scenario. We suppose the error-correcting code’s generator matrix is G,
and check matrix is Q. Then they encode X = (x0, x1, ..., xn−1) and Y =
(y0, y1, ..., yn−1) to X
′ = (x′0, x
′
1, ..., x
′
m−1) and Y
′ = (y′0, y
′
1, ..., y
′
m−1) with
the generator matrix G, respectively. There are
X ′ = X ·G, (1)
Y ′ = Y ·G. (2)
(2) Calvin prepares m triplet GHZ states all in
|ψ〉CAB = 1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉)CAB
=
1
2
(|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ | − +−〉+ | − −+〉)CAB,
(3)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are measured in Z basis, |+〉 and |−〉 are measured in X
basis, and |±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉). Calvin divides these m GHZ states into three
sequences SA, SB and SC , which includes the first, the second, and the third
particles of all GHZ states, respectively.
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(3) Calvin prepares some decoy photons prepared in states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, |−〉 in ran-
dom. He inserts these decoy photons in SA and SB at random positions to
form sequences S∗A and S
∗
B respectively. Calvin retains the quantum sequence
SC and sends the sequence S
∗
A to Alice, S
∗
B to Bob.
(4) When Alice and Bob receive S∗A and S
∗
B , Calvin announces the positions and
measurement base of these decoy photons. Alice and Bob measure them in the
same base and announce their outcome. If the error rate exceeds a rational
threshold, Calvin aborts the protocol and restarts from Step (1). Otherwise,
there is no eavesdropper, and the protocol continues to the next step.
(5) Alice and Bob recover SA and SB respectively by discarding the decoy photons.
Then Alice, Bob and Calvin measure SA, SB and SC in X basis, respectively.
If the measurement result is |+〉 (|−〉), then they encode it as the classical bit
0 (1). Thus, each of Alice, Bob and Calvin will obtainm bits from SA, SB and
SC , respectively. We denote each of them as k
A
i , k
B
i and k
C
i (i=0,1,...,m-1).
(6) Alice and Bob calculate x
′′
i = k
A
i ⊕ x
′
i and y
′′
i = k
B
i ⊕ y
′
i. They announce
X
′′
= (x
′′
0 , x
′′
1 , ..., x
′′
m−1) and Y
′′
= (y
′′
0 , y
′′
1 , .., y
′′
m−1) to Calvin.
(7) Calvin calculates c
′
i = k
C
i ⊕x
′′
i⊕y
′′
i , and getsm bits sequence C
′
= (c
′
0, c
′
1, ..., c
′
m−1).
(8) Then Calvin uses the check matrix Q to check whether the number of error
bits exceeds the threshold l. If it does, Calvin aborts the protocol and restarts
from Step (1). Otherwise, he gets n bits sequence C∗ by decoding C
′
with
error-correcting function D(C
′
). If there is at least one bit 1 in C∗, Calvin
announces X 6= Y . Otherwise, he announces X = Y .
In Ref. [24], the authors claimed the scheme was secure even in the practical
scenario. However, we will show how a malicious party gets the other’s secret input
by launching the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack in the next section.
3 Twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack on Li et al.’s QPC protocol and the
improvement
3.1 Twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack on Li et al.’s QPC protocol
As analyzed in Ref.[24], due to the decoy photons adopted in the Li et al.’s QPC
protocol, some well-known attacks, such as intercept-resend attack, measurement-
resend attack, and entanglement-resend attack, can be detected via the checking
mechanism. Unfortunately, we find Li et al.’s QPC protocol cannot resist a special
attack, i.e., the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack. To be specific, if any party (Alice or
Bob) performs the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, he/she can get the other’s secret
input. The detailed procedure of the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack is depicted as
follows.
Without loss of generality, we suppose Bob is malicious, who wants to get
Alice’s secret input. At first, Bob prepares m auxiliary particles all in the state
|0〉e, then, the GHZ state and an auxiliary particle compose a composite system:
|η〉 = |ψ〉CAB|0〉e
=
1√
2
(|0000〉+ |1110〉)CABe
=
1
2
(|+ ++ 0〉+ |+−− 0〉+ | −+− 0〉+ | − −+ 0〉)CABe,
(4)
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where the subscript C, A, B represent the particles in the hand of Calvin, Alice,
Bob, respectively, and the subscript e represents the auxiliary particle.
In Step (3), when Calvin sends the sequence S∗A to Alice, Bob may intercept S
∗
A
and execute a Hardmard (H) operation on every particle in S∗A to form sequence
S∗∗A . Then, he performs a controlled-NOT (CNOT) operationCAe on every particle
in S∗∗A and the corresponding auxiliary particle e. Here, the particle in S
∗∗
A is the
control qubit, while particle e is the target qubit. After that, Bob performs another
H operation on every particle in S∗∗A in order to restore sequence S
∗∗
A to S
∗
A, and
sends S∗A to Alice. What should be noted is that the transmitting sequence S
∗
A
remains unchanged.
Since Calvin announces the decoy photons’ positions in Step (4), Bob can dis-
card the auxiliary particles e which correspond to the decoy photons in S∗A. And
in Step (5), after Bob recovers SB by discarding the decoy photons, he executes
an H operation on every particle in SB to form sequence S
∗∗
B . Then Bob per-
forms a CNOT operation CBe on every particle (control particle) in S
∗∗
B and the
corresponding auxiliary particle e (target particle). After that, he performs a H
operation on every particle in S∗∗B , which aims to restore S
∗∗
B to SB , and every
auxiliary particle, respectively. Now, the state of the composite system is changed
into
|η′〉 = 1
2
(|++〉Ce(|++〉+ | − −〉)AB + | − −〉Ce(|+−〉+ | − +〉)AB). (5)
From Eq.(5), a rule can be concluded: if e is |+〉, particle A and particle B are in
the same state; and if e is |−〉, they are in the different states.
After Alice announcesX
′′
= (x
′′
0 , x
′′
1 , ..., x
′′
m−1) in Step (6), Bob measures them
in the X basis, and get the measurement result kei (i = 0, 1, ...,m−1). According to
kei and the rule from Eq.(5), Bob can obtain Alice’s states k
A
i (i = 0, 1, ...,m− 1).
Since X
′
has been announced by Alice, Bob can calculate x
′′
i ⊕ kAi = (kAi ⊕ x
′
i)⊕
kAi = x
′
i, that is to say, he can get Alice’s secret input x
′
i.
For sake of clearness, the above procedure of the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack
can be intuitively demonstrated by the following figure (See Fig. 1).
3.2 The improvement
In order to fix the loophole of Li et al.’s QPC protocol, we meliorate it by applying
a permutation operator before TP sends the particle sequences to all the partici-
pants. To be specific, Step (3), Step (4) and Step (5) in the original protocol need
to be revised as follows.
(3)∗ Calvin prepares two group r-length decoy photons sequences at random in
{|+〉, |−〉, |0〉, |1〉}, namely RA, RB , and concatenates them with SA (SB) to
form an extended sequence S
′
A = RA||SA (S
′
B = RB ||SB), respectively. Then
Calvin applies a permutation operator Π(r+m) on S
′
A (S
′
B) to create a new
sequence Π(r+m)S
′
A = S
∗
A (Π(r+m)S
′
B = S
∗
B), and sends the new sequence S
∗
A
to Alice, S∗B to Bob.
(4)∗ When Alice and Bob receive S∗A and S
∗
B, Calvin announces the coordinates
of the decoy qubits Πr (Πr ⊂ Πr+m) send by him, and the corresponding
measurement bases. Note that Calvin does not disclose the actual order of
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Fig. 1 The circuit diagram of the process of twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack. Here, |ψ〉CAB is
a GHZ state in the state (|000〉 + |111〉)/√2 shared by Calvin, Alice and Bob. H is Hadmard
operation, and  represents the controlled-NOT gate in which the top line denotes the
control qubit, the bottom line the target qubit.
the message qubits. Then Alice and Bob measure these decoy qubits in the
same bases and announce their outcomes. If the error rate exceeds a rational
threshold, Calvin aborts the protocol and restarts from Step (1); otherwise,
there is no eavesdropper, and the protocol continues to the next step.
(5)∗ Alice and Bob discard their decoy photons, and denote the left qubits in their
hands as S
′′
A and S
′′
B (i.e.,S
′′
A = ΠmSA, S
′′
B = ΠmSB), respectively. Then
Alice, Bob and Calvin measure S
′′
A, S
′′
B and SC in the X basis, respectively,
and obtainm bits, kAi , k
B
i and k
C
i (i=0,1,...,m-1 ), respectively. After they have
completed measurement operation, Calvin immediately announces the actual
order of the message qubits Πm (Πm ⊂ Πr+m). Using this information, Alice
(Bob) can rearrange kAi (k
B
i ) in correspondence with the original order of SA
(SB).
Let us examine the security of our improvement under the twice-Hadmard-
CNOT attack. Similarly, we suppose the malicious Bob aims to get Alice’s secret
input. In Step (3)∗, Since Calvin disrupts the sequences S
′
A and S
′
B by using
Π(r+m) to get S
∗
A, S
∗
B, it means the order of transmited sequences S
∗
A, S
∗
B is fully
disturbed. And after discarding the decoy qubits RA and RB in Step (5)
∗, Alice
and Bob can only get S
′′
A and S
′′
B , and cannot recover the original sequences SA
and SB because that Πm is only known by Calvin. So, even if Bob launch the
twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack, he cannot get the final state |η′〉 = 12 (|++〉Ce(|+
+〉+ | − −〉)AB + | − −〉Ce(+−〉+ | −+〉)AB). That is to say, Bob cannot get the
correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s qubits by measuring the auxiliary particles
e.
For simplicity, we take a simple two-bit private comparisonas example without
considering error-correcting code and the decoy photos. In the case, suppose Alice’s
input is 10, Bob’s input is 11, and Calvin prepares two GHZ states all in the state
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as Eq.(3),
|ψ〉C1A1B1 ⊗ |ψ〉C2A2B2 = 1/2(|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ | −+−〉+ | − −+〉)C1A1B1
⊗ 1/2(|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ | −+−〉+ | − −+〉)C2A2B2
(6)
In Step (3)∗, Calvin executes a permutation operator Πm=2 on sequence S
′
A and
S
′
B, then the system may be changed into
Πm=2(|ψ〉C1A1B1 ⊗ |ψ〉C2A2B2) = |ψ〉C1A2B2 ⊗ |ψ〉C2A1B1
= 1/4{|+〉C1(|++〉+ | − −〉)A2B2
⊗ |+〉C2(|++〉+ | − −〉)A1B1
+ |+〉C1(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A2B2
⊗ |−〉C2(|++〉+ | − −〉)A1B1
+ |−〉C1(|++〉+ | − −〉)A2B2
⊗ |+〉C2(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A1B1
+ |−〉C1(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A2B2
⊗ |−〉C2(+−〉+ | −+〉)A1B1}
(7)
After Bob performs the twice-Hadmard-CNOTattack, the composite system which
consists of GHZ state and auxiliary particle becomes
|η′〉1 ⊗ |η
′〉2 = 1/4{|+〉C1|+〉e1(|++〉+ | − −〉)A2B2
⊗ |+〉C2 |+〉e2(|++〉+ | − −〉)A1B1
+ |+〉C1 |−〉e1(|+−〉| −+〉)A2B2
⊗ |−〉C2 |+〉e2(|++〉+ | − −〉)A1B1
+ |−〉C1 |+〉e1(|++〉+ | − −〉)A2B2
⊗ |+〉C2 |−〉e2(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A1B1
+ |−〉C1 |−〉e1(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A2B2
⊗ |−〉C2 |−〉e2(|+−〉+ | −+〉)A1B1}.
(8)
From above equation, we cannot get the correlations between the states of {A1, B1}
or {A2, B2} according to the the final state of the auxiliary particle e1 or e2. That
means, Bob cannot steal Alice’s input through measuring the auxiliary particles.
So, we can say the improvement can resist the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack.
4 Conclusione
In all the QPC protocols, in order to ensure the protocol’s security, we must guar-
antee any participant only knows his (her) own secret input without obtaining
another’ secret input. In this paper, we firstly review and analyze Li et al.’s two-
party QPC protocol, and find it cannot resist the twice-Hadmard-CNOT attack,
i.e., if one participant Bob launches this attack, he (she) can get the other’s secret
input without being detected. For avoiding this loophole, we adopt the permuta-
tion operator to rearranges the quantum sequences sent to Alice and Bob from
Charlie. The delicate analysis shows the security of our improvement can be guar-
anteed well and truly.
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